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Abstract
Spam costs US corporations upwards of $8.9 billion a
year, and comprises as much as 40% of all email re-
ceived [1]. Solutions exist to reduce the amount of spam
seen by end users, but cannot withstand sophisticated at-
tacks. Worse yet, many will occasionally misclassify and
silently drop legitimate email. Spammers take advantage
of the near-zero cost of sending email to flood the net-
work, knowing that success even a tiny fraction of the time
means a profit. End users, however, have proven unwill-
ing to pay money to send email to friends and family.
We show that it is feasible to extend the existing mail
system to reduce the amount of unwanted email, without
misclassifying email, and without charging well-behaved
users. We require that bulk email senders accurately clas-
sify each email message they send as an advertisement
with an area of interest or else be charged a small nega-
tive incentive per message delivered. Recipients are able
to filter out email outside their scope of interest, while
senders are able to focus their sendings to the appropriate
audience.
1 Introduction
Unsolicited email has become a real problem. Companies
around the globe are losing billions of dollars each year in
the form of lost productivity. And the spammers are prof-
iting; 8% of Internet users bought something from spam
in 2003 [1].
Unfortunately, the numbers in this game favor the
spammers. A marketer can send billions of emails at neg-
ligible cost; to realize a profit, only a handful need result
in a sale. Every email which makes it through our arse-
nal of spam filters carries with it a very real cost to the
recipient, who must spend time to identify and discard the
message. Spammers have strong incentives to evade or
subvert any mechanism we deploy, while the recipients
bear the cost of dealing with any email that leaks through.
Antispam solutions generally attempt either to reduce
the leakage by improving the quality of filtration or to re-
duce the profit potential by imposing a cost for sending
spam. Approaches which attempt the former are in the un-
enviable position of not being able to safely err on either
side in their classification, as they risk either being inef-
fectual or dropping desired email. In this paper, we will
primarily take the latter approach, of introducing penalties
for sending spam, and we will show that in our system:
• Legitimate email is never misclassified or dropped.
• Well-behaved users do not pay to send email.
• Legitimate mass mailing is supported.
Clearly it is also necessary to provide attack resistance,
assuming sophisticated spammers who will optimize their
strategies for any solution we deploy.
This is accomplished by requiring bulk email senders
to accurately classify each email message they send as an
advertisement and its area of interest or else be charged a
small negative incentive per message delivered to a recipi-
ent, a micro-penalty. This micro-penalty multiplied by the
scale required for spam makes it uneconomic to lie. Re-
liable classification makes it feasible for email recipients
to filter out advertising emails that are outside their scope
of interest. We show that it is feasible to log all email so
that violations can be acted on quickly and securely while
resisting attacks, supporting opt-in mailing lists as well as
direct person-to-person email, and requiring only modest
changes to existing email servers while being economic to
deploy to Internet scale.
2 Tagging Bulk Mail
We require senders to annotate all bulk email with a
new header field, X-BULK-MAIL. At this time we de-
fine two types of bulk mail: advertising and mailing
lists (described further in Section 5). Advertising emails
are tagged with an ADV leader followed by a comma-
separated list of interest groups. Interest groups are de-
fined hierarchically, with terms separated by dots, and
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can be defined organically as the system evolves. For in-
stance, an advertisement for suntan lotion might include
the header
X-BULK-MAIL: ADV: REC.SPORTS.SWIMMING,
REC.SPORTS.SAILING
A user can easily establish filters to discard mail for cat-
egories he isn’t interested in. Ideally this would be pro-
vided as a service by his ISP.
When email received is considered to have been mis-
classified, whether because it is lacking the appropriate
header or because it has been designated with an inappro-
priate interest group, the user will forward the email to his
ISP using his email client’s bounce or redirect command.
This preserves the full headers of the email, allowing the
penalty phase of the system to take effect.
In our system, we define personal email to be any email
which does not carry an X-BULK-MAIL tag. It is treated
in the same way as bulk mail, and is presumed to be of in-
terest to all recipients. Email which is not of interest, such
as advertising, can be objected to on the basis of misclas-
sification.
3 Penalizing Misbehavior
Each email server is extended to log relevant header in-
formation from the mail it forwards over a window of
two weeks. Specifically, we store the (cryptographically
secure) hash of the DATE, TO, FROM, and RECEIVED
fields.
When an ISP receives a spam complaint, it can perform
a lookup to validate that the complaint references a gen-
uine email. It then forwards the complaint on to the pre-
vious relay in the path. It also requires the upstream relay
pay it the required micro-penalty. That relay will recover
the cost when it passes the complaint on.
The result of this process is as if the micro-penalty were
levied against the ISP of the sender by the ISP of the re-
cipient. The sender’s ISP can choose how to deal with
the complaint, but should at a minimum include forward-
ing the complaint to the user and imposing some form of
sanction.
For this system of penalties to work, we must also es-
tablish a few procedural elements. First, as stated before,
we have a history of forwarded email to work from to pre-
vent fraudulent use of the penalty system. We also refuse
to forward email that is more than a week old. An en-
forceable penalty process must be set up between SMTP
peers, and relays must refuse unknown connections. In
section 7 we discuss how an ISP might redirect unknown
relays to more permissive ingress points. Finally, ISPs
must specify some form of ingress rate limit, to bound
their potential outstanding liability. The monthly service
fee paid by end users could be considered a bond against
which the user borrows to send email.
The impact of these constraints on typical clients is neg-
ligible. Consider an ISP which charges $30/mo for Inter-
net access, and a micro-penalty fee of $0.10. The ISP
limits customers to sending 100 emails per week, and ter-
minates accounts on receipt of 10 spam complaints over
a 3-month period. In this scenario, the ISP has a maxi-
mum outstanding liability of $20.90 per client, which is
safely less than the monthly service fee. The ISP could
also choose to allow clients to reset their spam counter in
exchange for a $1 fee. Clients would need to send more
than 100 emails in a one week or send 10 offensive emails
before noticing the constraints of the system. Upgraded
accounts with an explicit surety could be provided to ad-
dress these issues for the handful of customers who re-
quire greater flexibility.
To the spammer, however, even a $0.10 fee is profound.
As a reference point consider DoubleClick, which pro-
vides legitimate marketers with the tools needed to main-
tain high-quality lists of interested users. For these lists
in Q1 of 2004 [12], DoubleClick customers saw a rev-
enue of $0.23 per email. Few enterprises could afford to
spend 40% of their revenue on marketing, and few spam-
mers will have returns anywhere close to that seen by the
carefully culled lists maintained by professional market-
ing companies.
4 Attack Resistance
For clarity of presentation, we have so far ignored the
possibility of malicious entities. It is critical, however,
to demonstrate that attackers cannot evade the system to
send email without being held accountable, and that they
cannot subvert the system to charge innocent users.
4.1 Assigning Responsibility
Suppose Alice receives spam, for which she forwards a
complaint to her ISP. There are only three possible attack-
ers: the sender, some host on the path, and the receiver
(her ISP). There is no way to send email in our record
route environment without being on-path (unless there is
an on-path accomplice, which is itself an attacker).
Assuming that there are no misbehaving hosts on the
path between Alice and the sender, it is clear the spammer
will be charged. Using a fake return address will not help,
since the complaint will use the unforgeable portion of the
RECEIVED header path to reach his ISP, which has a clear
economic incentive to correctly identify the true sender as
well as the means to do so, since it controls where and
how email enters its network. The complaint cannot be
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forwarded by the sender to another host because it will
not be present in the mail history for that node.
Suppose there is some host on the path between Alice
and the sender which is misbehaving. It cannot refuse to
validate the spam complaint without jeopardizing its re-
lationship with its downstream peer. The complaint will,
in turn, only be accepted by the upstream ISP towards the
true sender. Spam forged by this host would result in the
host receiving complaints which could not be forwarded
to any “upstream” peers.
This misbehaving host could hijack legitimate mail
traffic by replacing the body of the email. This would
be detected by the endpoints of the communication chan-
nel, and eventually the culprit uncloaked. This more per-
nicious attack also requires the malignant host be on the
path between Alice and some other user she wants to talk
with, which is already unlikely given the short length of
typical SMTP relay paths and the relative trustworthiness
of genuinely on-path hosts.
Finally, Alice’s ISP could itself send her spam, or
refuse to take action against spammers within the local
network. The free market suggests that such ISPs will not
last very long, as users who find this behavior distasteful
will simply take their business elsewhere.
4.2 Protecting Innocent Users
We also prevent malicious nodes from abusing the spam
reporting system itself. In this case, the attacker could be
an endpoint, some ISP on the path between two nodes, or
an off-path entity.
A client can only complain about an email she actually
receives because ISPs validate all complaints against their
histories. This also automatically excludes reverse path
forgery and makes it easy to prevent recipients from filing
more than one complaint per spam.
A malicious on-path node is prevented from forging
complaints for the same reasons as for an endpoint. It
would be possible for the node to generate spam com-
plaints about email which it was only supposed to for-
ward. However, because the sender is informed when
complaints are lodged, this type of misbehavior can be
easily detected.
A true off-path attacker would need to somehow derive
the headers of emails traversing the network in order to
file spam complaints. Guessing these would not be fea-
sible, but the attacker might try to snoop email sessions
or have an on-path accomplice forward the relevant data.
However, it still would not be possible for the attacker to
introduce a spam complaint into the network at any of the
well-behaved relays, as these nodes would know the at-
tacker was not a suitable next hop for the original email.
4.3 Other Issues
It is conceivable that users might accidentally file spam
complaints against desirable email. Anecdotal evidence
from the SPAM-L mailing list [2] indicates that some of
the spam reports generated in AOL’s Feedback Loop [6]
are a result of just this effect. In general, lower rates of
spam are likely to lead to less accidental complaints. Sim-
ple interface improvements, such as requesting confirma-
tion or password entry may also help to further reduce
this effect. Finally, our future work on conversational in-
demnity should also help reduce the impact of accidental
reports.
The issue of zombie hosts is also of concern, because
it violates the assumption that email sent by a host is in-
tentional by the user. However, the amount of damage a
single host can do is severely constrained due to the req-
uisite ingress rate limiting. Furthermore, the threat of los-
ing email privileges gives users a real incentive to notice
and promptly clean up infections. Finally, consumer ISPs
could provide as a service to customers some level of early
notification and/or prevention through signature analysis
or other monitoring technique. In the end, we must hold a
user accountable for the behavior of his computer.
5 Opt-in Bulk Mail
Mailing lists are special cases of bulk mailers, because
although they may need to send a number of messages
each day to thousands of subscribers, they have explicitly
been allowed to do so by the process of subscription. In
light of this, it does not seem practical for the mailing
list to assume liability for every subscriber. Nor does it
seem fair to charge the original sender for every ultimate
recipient, when the sender cannot necessarily determine
in advance who those individuals are. However, it is also
clear that mailing lists are a widely used, and therefore
desirable, feature of the current email system.
To solve this we introduce recipient-side whitelisting.
When an opt-in bulk sender (such as a mailing list) sends
email, it flags it with a special X-BULK-MAIL header,
which consists of a LIST leader followed by an identifier
for the list. The identifier could either be derived from the
list name or could be a random nonce. For instance,
X-BULK-MAIL: LIST: FREEFOOD.348290
SMTP relays along the path do not include entries in their
histories for such email. The final relay, however, will
drop any email marked as list mail which is not explicitly
whitelisted by that recipient. Whitelisting is done based
on the list identifier and, optionally, the reverse path to
the mailing list’s remailer.
This mechanism works in exactly the way we expect
mailing lists to operate. The act of subscription adds the
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user’s email address to the list of addresses on the list and
also adds the list to the local whitelist. Unsubscription is
simply removing the mailing list from the local whitelist.
Additionally, we gain the ability to force withdrawal from
a list by removing the local whitelist entry.
From the viewpoint of the list operator, opt-in lists in
our system carry the benefit of guaranteed protection from
liability, because users cede their ability to complain by
virtue of subscribing to the list. List operators could abuse
this power by filling the list with spam, but the ability to
force unsubscription means that users only pay temporar-
ily for their mistakes.
6 Implementation
As a reference implementation we have produced an
SMTP proxy intended to be placed in front of a site’s ex-
isting infrastructure. From this vantage point it is straight-
forward to inspect all messages entering the network from
an SMTP peer and to log the requisite hash. Similarly,
messages from internal users destined for the outside
world can be logged and rate controlled.
This is also a suitable location to deal with spam com-
plaints. When a user receives an undesirable message, he
simply redirects the message (this preserves the original
headers) to SPAMSINK@LOCALDOMAIN, and the proxy
intercepts this message. It strips off the downstream head-
ers, validates the message against its logs, and then for-
wards the complaint upstream. In particular, note that it is
not necessary to log at every SMTP host; within a single
domain of trust, only one log point is necessary.
To avoid duplication of configuration information, our
proxy is tightly coupled to a slave SMTP server. Com-
mands are passed directly through to the downstream
server, except where needed to preserve the semantics
of the SMTP protocol. The proxy can then determine
whether a command was successful by inspecting the
server’s response, and takes that into account when up-
dating its state. The upshot of this is that the proxy server
can depend upon the real server to enforce any policies the
site may have in place (for instance, the set of address-
able destinations) without needing any separate logic or
configuration. The only notable exception to this is user
authentication, which the proxy needs to know about in
order to perform rate limiting. But it only makes sense
that the proxy should provide this, as existing servers lack
the functionality.
The exact performance characteristics of the proxy will,
naturally, depend upon the load characteristics of the site
it serves. We assume an ISP such as Princeton Univer-
sity [7] (which publishes its SMTP traffic statistics on-
line). A generous interpretation of the statistics available
shows that in the month of February, 2005, Princeton saw
at most a few thousand SMTP messages per minute. This
figure is roughly in line with CAIDA measurements of 1.6
million SMTP sessions per day [13].
If we assume a constant rate of 3000 messages per
minute, or 60 million messages over the two-week win-
dow, our solution requires about 3 gigabytes of storage for
logging. Our experiments show that storing the log entry
for each email costs approximately 3.1msec on a single-
proc P4 3.2GHz with 10k RPM SATA drive; for the sug-
gested load this means the SMTP relay (or a dedicated
logging machine) will spend 15% of its time dealing with
hashes. Checking a spam complaint against the database
of log entries costs just 0.77 msec. Computing the hash
for an email costs just 39 usec.
Full performance results, including analysis of perfor-
mance under load bursts, are pending. However, the re-
sults shown here do not include any attempts to optimize
the logging mechanism; each write results in synchronous
disk I/O. Note that it should be possible to maintain the
entire 3GB of history in memory for reasonable cost, with
periodic writes to disk just to prevent data loss in the event
of a crash. Writing the whole hash table to disk takes less
than 5 minutes, and could of course be done in stages.
7 Incremental Deployment
Although we present this work in a context which assumes
global deployment, it is also incrementally deployable, by
which we mean that there is a benefit realized by ISPs who
deploy this system, even if all of their neighbors do not.
Specifically, an ISP who deploys our proposal can guar-
antee that it will never drop email for its customers, while
also moderating the risk that this will cause an increase in
spam load.
Assume some ISP chooses to deploy our system. It will
then have two categories of neighbors: those with whom
it can negotiate contracts, and those with whom it cannot.
When an ISP can set up the contractual arrangement we
specified earlier, it need not care if the peer ISP has also
deployed the system or not, because that ISP has already
agreed to be accountable for all the email it sends.
When an ISP cannot set up a contractual relationship
with another ISP, it must instead treat that neighbor as a
potential spammer. Specifically, it should keep track of
the amount of spam received from that specific ISP so that
exceeding some threshold (say 100 objectionable emails
in a month) will cause the peer to be cut off. Future email
from that peer can then be bounced, with an indication
that the ISP has been identified as a source of spam and a
few remedies suggested (such as switching to a compliant
ISP or asking your ISP to become compliant). Our de-
ploying ISP does assume financial responsibility for any
email accepted from this peer ISP, particularly if it is not
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destined for one of its direct customers. It is important to
realize that there is no requirement that one must accept
email from anyone on the Internet; as such these peer-
ing relationships can be pre-screened to eliminate known
spammers.
Additionally, during this transitional phase, ISPs can
continue to use traditional antispam techniques such as
content-based filtration or blacklisting. These techniques
are not particularly useful in a world where everyone has
deployed our system, but they can be applied against these
“unaccountable” peer ISPs. However, it should be under-
stood that to avoid silently dropping email, an indicative
error response must be sent back if the traditional methods
cause the email to be classified as spam.
In this paper we treat the SMTP reverse path is if
there could be any number of ISPs on the path between
sender and recipient. In practice, of course, the sender ISP
will contact the recipient’s ISP directly (by performing a
lookup of an MX record for the destination domain). But
it is impractical to assume that every pair of ISPs will be
able to negotiate (and enforce) the contractual relationship
we require. Rather, deployment of our system will result
in baby ISPs signing contracts with larger for the ability to
participate in the global exchange of email. Conveniently,
there is enough flexibility in the system of MX records
to allow automatic traversal of the tree (or several trees).
When an unknown peer attempts to send email, the recip-
ient’s server will simply terminate the session, at which
point the sender will happily try the next entry in the list.
In this manner, email ingress gradually moves from less
permissive to more permissive, eventually settling on the
appropriate entry point.
8 Related Work
A number of different solutions to the spam problem have
been suggested; some have even seen widespread deploy-
ment. Unfortunately, the existing literature has not accu-
rately gauged the sophistication of the attackers, leading
to solutions which are not effective enough to stem the
ongoing flood of spam.
Content-based filtering solutions, particularly those
based on machine learning, have been the most effective
anti-spam treatment to date. But they will never be able to
guarantee that they will not decide to randomly drop legit-
imate email. This is an anathema in a world where we are
trying to push to five-nine reliability and beyond. Worse
yet, because these solutions will always leak some amount
of traffic, they fail to address the core issue that spamming
will continue to be profitable so long as a trickle of band-
width exists. In general, not only is content-based filtering
dangerous because it leads to false positives, it continually
becomes less effective as spammers learn how to construct
emails to get around the filtering algorithms.
More than a decade ago, Dwork and Naor introduced
the idea of using computational stamps to price email [8].
This idea has been respun in a variety of different clothes,
including a recent paper by Balakrishnan and Karger [9].
Unfortunately, such solutions are unlikely to ever suc-
ceed, because users are simply not willing to pay for a
service they view as being free. And if the fee is purely
computational (as suggested by the original work), then
it is too easy to farm the computation off to unknow-
ing users through the use of a botnet, cooperative spy-
ware, or even a background javascript task on a popu-
lar webpage. Advances in reverse Turing tests such as
CAPTCHAs [5], though appealing in concept as a method
of postage stamping will suffer from the same popularity
problems. Additionally, spammers have apparently found
ways to offload this processing by using the puzzle images
as conditions for admission to porn sites [4].
There is also a continual effort from within the Internet
community to maintain various blacklists, which are then
used to drop spam. In theory these should never produce
false positives, as only mail validated as spam is added
to the list. But they cannot prevent letting some spam
through, and thus are not a true deterrent. Additionally,
lists driven by Internet telescopy will only work so long
as spammers are not aware of the set of trigger addresses.
Lists driven by voluntary reporting are even scarier; even-
tually spammers will find a way to pollute these lists with
false reports, at which point claims of never dropping de-
sirable mail go out the window. Explicit whitelist solu-
tions such as ChoiceMail [3] provide an interesting twist.
They do provide the additional benefit of requiring email
to have a legitimate return address. However, the whitelist
request mechanism can itself be leveraged to spam. Re-
verse Turing tests, though better suited to this application
than email stamping, still suffer the same issues of being
sharable.
The sheer scale of the spam problem on the Internet to-
day, coupled with the technological savvy exhibited by
spammers, leaves us with little choice but to introduce
accountability into the network, and then establishing a
system of economic disincentives for abusers. Our so-
lution does this by introducing logs within the network.
The Bonded Sender [10] and SHRED [11] systems sug-
gest achieving this goal through the use of what are ef-
fectively prepurchased cryptographic stamps belonging to
some trusted third party. The Bonded Sender solution,
though, because it only tries to target (legitimate) bulk
mailers, is only able to solve part of the problem. The
SHRED proposal, recent research by Krishnamurthy and
Blackmond, does seem more promising. It is our belief
that by providing validation from within the network, we
are able to achieve better attack resistance. In particular,
we demonstrate in this paper that the economic disincen-
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tives of our system will always work against spammers;
solutions requiring trusted parties are likely to find it dif-
ficult to provide the same level of assurance. Addition-
ally, by providing spammers with the ability to achieve
legitimacy by classifying their email, we simultaneously
reduce the load on the penalty system and give users better
automated visibility into the email they receive.
9 Future Work
One way in which this system could readily be extended
would be to provide conversational indemnity. That is, in-
clude the ability to negate a spam complaint by presenting
evidence (in the form of a prior email) that the other party
initiated communication. This could be validated by the
ISPs at each end of the communication chain using the
same hash history table which we use to validate spam
complaints.
This sort of conversation-based indemnity could also be
used to reduce the effect of accidental complaints. Addi-
tionally, this mechanism could be used to make it safe to
set up an email autoresponder (along the lines of the unix
vacation program) without turning your computer into an
attack reflector. It might also be possible for ISPs to use
this mechanism to relax ingress limits on users, since a re-
sponse to an email would constitute an acknowledgment
that the original email was not spam.
The challenge here is in ensuring that an attacker can-
not leverage the indemnity mechanism to evade penalty
(for instance, by playing with the 2-week history window
or reusing the same refutation multiple times). Addition-
ally, the ISP should be able to automatically refute a com-
plaint on behalf of the user, but we do not want the ISP to
maintain copies of all of a user’s email.
10 Conclusion
We describe a system in which bulk email senders are
required to accurately classify each email message they
send or be charged a small negative incentive for each
recipient. A history of forwarded email receipts main-
tained by relays along the path provides automated ver-
ification for spam complaints by recipients, which are
forwarded towards senders to provide a robust, attack-
resistant penalty mechanism.
We show that this system allows person-to-person and
opt-in bulk email for free, without ever misclassifying or
dropping email, needs only modest changes to the exist-
ing SMTP infrastructure, and remains scalable to Internet
scale. Novel contributions include the use of service fees
as sureties for typical consumers, the separation of and
improved protection for inherently opt-in mailing list bulk
mail versus opt-out lists, and the enforceability of volun-
tary classification by advertisers.
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